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On August 6, 2019, the 119 members of the School of criminal justice, forensic science and criminology at
the University of Lausanne were the target of an online scammer. His/her modus operandi consisted of
email masquerading as the Director of the School in an attempt to induce the victims to buy digital gift
cards and to transmit the card usage code to the perpetrator.
The first author of this paper is the Director of the School, and the second is an expert in digital
forensic science and a professor of the School. They worked together in real time to deal with the fraud.
Because the fraud occurred in a School of forensic science and criminology, it raised many questions on a
variety of overlapping dimensions. The objective of this study was, therefore, to draw lessons from this
case from several perspectives ranging from forensic science to cybersecurity, and from practical to
academic.
The response to the incident has been treated in four typical distinguishable phases: (1) fraud
detection; (2) crisis management; (3) post-incident analysis; and (4) reporting to different communities.
We conclude this paper by taking lessons from the case to express the essential role of forensic
knowledge and crime analysis in interpreting the information conveyed by digital traces to develop
innovative cross-disciplinary models for preventing, detecting, analysing, investigating and responding
to online fraud.
© 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Recently, the volume and variety of online frauds have been
more clearly expressed through official crime statistics and surveys
(BCS, 2016; Reep-van den Bergh and Junger, 2018). They describe
the emergence of a new wave of crime or “cyber-volume crimes”,
perceptible to the public, which requires a rapid and structured
response. By whom and how it should be organised between public
and private stakeholders remains unclear, however (Dupont, 2017;
Loveday, 2018).
Several professional and academic communities are developing
integrative models for dealing with cybersecurity and potentially
covering the issue. Their aim is to ensure better protection and
resilience of infrastructures, as well as an effective response to
computer security incidents, whether at individual, organisational), Thomas.Souvignet@unil.ch
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tigation, https://doi.org/10.10or even national levels (Cichonski et al., 2012; CMM, 2016; NIST,
2018). They mainly adopt a technical and information technology
risk management vision, but also incorporate legal or social aspects
intrinsic to these problems. The inclusion of forensic science within
incident response practices was also considered early in these
models (Kent et al., 2006). At the same time, a “digital forensics”
community was emerging, supporting the detection, collection and
management of digital evidence in judicial processes (Pollitt, 2010).
Beyond this traditional scope of forensic science, a forensic analysis
approach has also proven to be essential to decipher the modus
operandi of the attackers, and thus gather the knowledge to better
protect an infrastructure (Casey and Nikkel, 2020). Cybersecurity
and digital forensics are now routinely implemented as specialized
departments in private and public organizations or as services.
Digital Forensics and Incident Response (DFIR) is considered to be a
sub-domain, which is involved in particular when a rapid response
to incidents is required.
However, these developments are predominately technical and
are primarily focused on high-profile cases such as major crimes,
state-sponsored cyberattacks, and theft of large amounts of moneynder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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tools play an important role in dealing with cybercrime, they are
not sufficient for dealing with new forms of high volume crimes
enabled by the technological infrastructures that have become
ubiquitous in everyday life (Loveday, 2018). Awide variety of online
frauds are among these crimes that have become part of a digitally
transformed society in which human factors play the central role.
The coronavirus has shown how suddenly new online modus
operandi can appear when the social context changes and people's
routine activities are disrupted.1 Online fraud is therefore difficult
to model and mitigate entirely using a DFIR approach. It is prefer-
able to integrate a strong crime analysis component bringing new
insights from criminology. A new stream of criminological research
is attempting to better delimit the size of the problem and its forms
(Button, Lewis and Tapley, 2009; Reep-van den Bergh and Junger,
2018), to adapt existing theories in an attempt to explain them (
Leukfeldt and Yar, 2016), to characterize the phenomenon more
specifically ( Leukfeldt et al., 2017; Wall, 2010), study it from the
victim's perspective ( Button et al., 2014a; Button et al., 2014b;
Cross, 2018; Whitty, 2019) or consider the kinds of possible re-
sponses (Holt and Bossler, 2016).
From a practical perspective, the police, in particular, are ex-
pected to respond in a professional manner to an increasing
number of solicitations from the victims of these frauds. This is not
only about creating new specialized structures. The whole organi-
zation has to adapt, from the field officers in charge of receiving
complaints and communicating with the public, to a more central,
specialized or managerial level (Loveday, 2018). New partnerships
need to be created. Forensic science and crime analysis, both as
disciplines and as structures, must also find their place in these
changes (Rossy and Ribaux, 2020).
A practical case concretizes remaining challenges in combining
different views and approach to online fraud, both from an R&D
and a practical point of view. On August 6, 2019, members of the
School of Criminal Justice at University of Lausanne, were the target
of an online fraud consisting of email masquerading as the Director
in order to obtain money from them in the form of digital gift cards.
Both authors of this paper were directly concerned by the fraud.
The first being the Director of the school, and the second as a
professor of digital forensic science. They both worked together to
deal with this fraud in real time.
This case-study is decomposed in four chapters, by similarity
with typical incident response methodologies (Cichonski et al.,
2012): (1) fraud detection; (2) crisis management; (3) post-
incident analysis and (4) reporting to communities. Lessons
learned from this case are eventually integrated into a broader
discussion of the central role of forensic science and crime analysis
in dealing with online frauds.
2. The detection
On August 6, 2019, the Director of the School of Criminal Justice
(SCJ) at University of Lausannewas on holidays. It was a rainy day. A
perfect day to work from the hotel on a paper in preparation. The
mailbox was open on the computer, letting incoming mail through,
mostly mixing spams with messages relevant to the organization
(several dozen).
When scanning the emails quickly, one of them seemed unusual
(message #1 - Fig. 1). This email was sent by a new employee of the
School, who we will call Y for the rest of this article. It was the first
sign that something was wrong. However, it did not trigger any
action at that time. It just caused some surprise.1 https://www.cyberthreatcoalition.org/(accessed 2nd of April, 2020).
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A little later, a second sign was perceived by the Director,
through an email from a colleague, displaying his availability, but
asking if his identity was not usurped (message #2 - Fig. 2).
Time: 12:45 pm.
Almost at the same time, the second author of this paper sent a
WhatsApp message to the Director: “Hello, did you get hacked into
your Gmail account?“. In fact, he had also received the message
“Helloyou are available?” from the same wrong address. Another
colleague then phoned the manager to inform him that he had
received a strange “Are you available?”message. He replied, but felt
uncomfortable.
Without any delay, the Director responded to message #2 (first
colleague) to indicate that a fraud was probably in progress at the
school, warning his colleague not to continue the dialogue with the
sender of the email.
From these signs, it became clear that a fraud was now under-
way. The perpetrator(s)2 of the fraud was claiming to be the Di-
rector in order to convince the employees to enter into his scenario.
Beyond the fraud itself, it was emotionally difficult for the Director
to imagine someone impersonating him and taking his position to
demand a service from members of the School. He was therefore
determined to take urgent action.
Time: 12:48 pm.
3. The management of the crisis
Although not a crisis management specialist, the Director
adopted a usual structured approach in two steps: (1) assess the
situation, and (2) consider urgent measures to mitigate the im-
mediate development and impact of the fraud. When assessing the
situation, it is necessary to identify the appropriate structures and
people to be activated, according to their competencies (both as an
authority and skills). Immediately five possibilities presented
themselves:
1. The police
2. The University IT department
3. Google (because of Gmail)
4. Create an ad hoc crisis unit with a colleague, who communi-
cated remotely via WhatsApp
5. Mobilize other members of the School
Immediately, the fourth solution imposed itself in the immedi-
ate situation: the police and Google were perceived as difficult to
mobilize to deal with such an event in real time; before alerting the
university, it was decided to observe the evolution of fraud. In the
end, it was not considered reasonable to mobilize more people
from the School during the holidays.
This was not an ideal setting for an ad hoc crisis management, as
both were on holidays distant from each other. One of them was
visiting a tourist site with his family.
The Director then entered into an intensive exchange of What-
sApp messages with a colleague, a digital forensic expert. Two
different perceptions of what was happening emerged from this
discussion: Hypothesis A: the fraud targets were all contacts of the
Director, obtained in an unknown manner. Hypothesis B: the fraud
only targets SCJ employees whose addresses were obtained in an
unknown manner.
Hypothesis A was favored by the forensic expert. During his2 The hypothesis of a single fraudster or of a group of fraudsters is discussed
below. In order to avoid overloading the text before, we will use the singular form,
letting tacitly the hypothesis of several perpetrators open.
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Fig. 1. First email received (message #1). It was an order for an iTunes card, for CHF 200 (approx. US$ 200). The sender of the email is a doctoral student from the School. In fact,
this doctoral student (Y) had just arrived at the School. Her name had not yet been memorized by the Director. Without any context, the email went unnoticed in the daily flow of
emails. Note that the email was sent to two different addresses: one on a Gmail address, and the other one at unil. ch, which is the institutional domain name.
Fig. 2. Second email received (message #2). “Hello Olivier, I'm back from lunch around 1:15 pm, and available. That's you “olivierribaux04@gmail.com” (see sender below), or
someone is trying to use your identity? Best regards”. Colleagues were supposed to know that the Director was on vacation. Note that the message transmitted (“Hello are you
available?”) is in English whereas the common language of communication between the members of the School is French.
O. Ribaux, T.R. Souvignet / Forensic Science International: Digital Investigation xxx (xxxx) xxx 3career, he was repeatedly confronted with the type of fraud called
“emergency scam” or “crying for help scam”. In this typical type of
fraud, a person's email contacts are stolen by various means and
they are used to request assistance under many pretexts, in order to
obtain something of monetary value.Please cite this article as: Ribaux, O., Souvignet, T.R., “Hello are you ava
Forensic Science International: Digital Investigation, https://doi.org/10.10Hypothesis B was preferred by the Director. He might be biased,
because Hypothesis A would mean that his email account or
computer was hacked and that all his contacts were stolen, which
would have more serious ramifications for him and the university.
If Hypothesis A was true, the Director should immediatelyilable?” Dealing with online frauds and the role of forensic science,
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inform his contacts of possible fraud, and contact his bank and
government to check for any suspicious activity. Thesewould be the
minimum precautions he should take, and further actions could be
necessary if the possible exposure was his computer or if there
were subsequent indications of identity theft.
If Hypothesis B was true, the circle of possible targets was much
easier to define and reach. At the same time, an institutional list of
targets wasmore likely to have been obtained by some other means
than by hacking an email account or computer. As the fraud seemed
to have progressed gradually, a key success factor under this hy-
pothesis was the speed of the incident response.
It was then that the Director decided to act by informing all the
employees of the School (message #3 - Fig. 3).
Time: 12:57 pm.
This post created the progressive reaction of many members
who provided information to the Director by email, or by other
means of communication. One of them sent the following inter-
esting message to the Director, bringing new information on the
modus operandi. It was also a sign that some colleagues were
currently responding to the initial message “Hello are you avail-
able?” (message #4 - Fig. 4).
In this message, two aspects mitigated the impact of the
fraudster's message: the French used contained small mistakes. In
addition, generally French uses either the polite form “vous” (you)
or the more familiar form “tu”. Here, the fraudster used the polite
form, while among colleagues, the “tu” is generally preferred.
Moreover, a time difference was apparent. The first message was
supposed to have been sent at 12:26 p.m., while the colleague's
response is traced at 11:51 a.m. There are many possible explana-
tions about the time indicated in forwarded emails, but this
discrepancy might be explained by a timezone difference between
the place fromwhere the perpetrator is acting and the place where
the recipients are located.
It also appeared from the series of message received by the
Director, that members of the School did not receive the messages
at the same time: the fraudster did not send the messages all at
once.
It was at this point that the connection with message #1 made
sense. Indeed, from this moment, the modus operandi became
much clearer:Fig. 3. The email sent to all the employees of the School (message #3). “Dear all, there is c
this message. We are trying to find out where it came from”.
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available?’ message;
 The perpetrator gradually sends messages, with a low degree of
computerization and relatively poor French;
 The fraudster enters into a real-time discussion with their tar-
gets, pretending to be at a meeting preventing any other form of
communication than email. He is asking for urgent help to get
iTunes cards (see Fig. 1);
 At least one doctoral student (Y) has fallen into the trap of
buying such cards;
 Due to time difference traced in the emails, there are signs that
the perpetrator is located in another country.
A specific message was sent to Y who had just realized that she
had been the victim of the scam.
Time: 01:15 pm.
The Director then decided that it was time to alert the IT
department of the University to the current situation, at least by an
email to the helpdesk (this is how staff are required to communi-
cate with the department). The sender of such an email immedi-
ately receives an automatic reply, certifying that the request will be
taken into account. The message contains a ticket number. In our
situation, this kind of response was very frustrating because time
was critical for the immediate handling of the fraud. The Director
tried to call the IT department but was unsuccessful, the employee
insisting that he forwarded the request and rejecting the idea of
creating a link with the person in charge.
Time: 01:37 pm.
At the same time, remote WhatsApp exchanges continued
within the small crisis unit composed of the forensic expert and the
Director. Hypothesis A continued to be confronted with Hypothesis
B. The balance, however, tilted towards Hypothesis B, knowing that
only members of the School had so far shown signs of having
received the “Hello are you available?” message. However, the Di-
rector checked Hypothesis A in more depth by asking others in his
email contacts if they had also received the message. As it was the
holidays, he only received one negative response, 3 hours later.
The Director then attempted, by email, to inform an investiga-
tion service of the police specializing in the fight against cyber-
crimes. He has frequent contacts for research with this department.
Time: 01:58 pm.urrently an attempt to use my name with a Gmail address to contact you. I did not send
ilable?” Dealing with online frauds and the role of forensic science,
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Fig. 4. Thread of a conversation with the fraudster (message #4).We translate. The colleague: ‘I am in Bern, but reachable’. The fraudster: “I'm in a meeting right now and that's
why I'm contacting you through here. I should have called you but phone is not allowed to be used during the meeting. I don't know when the meeting will be rounding off and I
want you to help me out on something very important right away.” Note the time difference of 1 hour between the sender and the receiver.
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provided an answer with the following content (translated from
French):
“Following your message, our team produced a script to inter-
cept any mail sent to the “false” address.”
We learned later that the script was already implemented at
1:44 p.m., 7 minutes after receiving the Director's message. This
action considerably limited the possibilities for the fraudster to
continue to deploy his/her fraud. The IT department then collected
all the emails that were sent to the fraudster andwarned the people
concerned not to interact with him.
Time: 02:26 pm.
The next hour and a half was mainly devoted to:
 responding to the numerous messages sent by members of the
School about the fraud;
 attempting to obtain the IP address of the fraudster's computer
by trapping a message sent to him/her. This was before anyone
knew that the IT department had redirected the messages sent
to the fraudster from the School. Indeed, this specific trapped
message was read by the IT department, providing a location of
the IP number on the Campus. This misdirection created some
confusion about a possible intervention on the Campus!
 continuing to weigh Hypothesis A versus B. The police cyber-
crime department eventually provided advice along the same
lines as Hypothesis A (the same as the forensic expert). How-
ever, further inquiries and evaluation of available information
made it clear that Hypothesis A had to be rejected in favour of
Hypothesis B;
 discussing new information from the Computer Science
Department, which mentioned that other departments of the
University had been similarly victimized.
The fraud was finally considered to be over. At 03:58 p.m., a new
message was sent to all employees of the School, mentioning thePlease cite this article as: Ribaux, O., Souvignet, T.R., “Hello are you ava
Forensic Science International: Digital Investigation, https://doi.org/10.10reality of the fraud and the measures that had been taken to secure
the environment.
4. The post-incident analysis
A post-incident analysis was considered essential:
1. Meet with Y to address the potential psychological and financial
impact of being victimized by fraud (message #1);
2. Determine if other members of the School were affected by the
fraud. It was obviously very delicate, due to privacy and the fact
that potential victims would not want to let it be known;
3. Learn more about the modus operandi, the extent of the fraud
and the perpetrators would help assess the need to report the
matter to the police for prosecution;
4. The School, as an organization, must constantly analyze its
vulnerabilities and the effectiveness of its responses to in-
cidents. Since the fraud may have concerned the whole Uni-
versity (and beyond), such an analysis would also be of interest
beyond the School's structure;
5. The School shall deploy intensive research on crime trans-
formations and how to situate the role of criminology and
forensic science in their study and treatment. Such a case would
also constitute relevant teaching material.4.1. Method
During the two weeks following the fraud, six lines of actions
were chosen to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the
fraud and associated crime phenomenon and victimology:
1. It was decided to interview Y, in order to discuss the whole
thread of the discussion with the aggressor, and address the
potential psychological and financial impact on her;ilable?” Dealing with online frauds and the role of forensic science,
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(one week later) to assess the number of people who received
the message “Hello are you available?”, when they received the
email, if they have been victimized, if a category of employees
has been specifically targeted, in what order. The response rate
was 66% (N ¼ 76);
3. Open source forensic data was analyzed to learn more about the
modus operandi, trying to locate the offender(s), and to deter-
mine if the case was worth reporting;
4. A literature and open sources research was carried out to
discover if similar modus operandi were already known, in
which context and what kind of interpretations was available;
5. A meeting with the IT department was organized to discuss the
fraud, its evolution, its interaction with the department during
the event, to examine other available traces and possible future
actions.
Due to the lack of time, resources and knowledge, it is not
claimed that all of these dimensions have been dealt with in a
sufficiently structured and comprehensive manner. However, they
each illuminated different aspects of the problem which helped
clarify its interpretation.
4.2. Results
Themain result for the School that emerged from this analysis is
that no one seems to have been ultimately victimized. Even Y, once
informed of the fraud, finally succeeded in canceling the order.
The specific mechanisms of the fraud was investigated. They
were mainly based on the traces, and email exchanges collected
from the members of the School.
4.2.1. Pattern of activity
If the perpetrator had not obtained the email addresses of a
member of the School, how did he proceed? The hypothesis that he
or she visited the institutional site was naturally formulated. This
website offers access to the individual page of each member of the
School, containing the profile of each employee, including their
email address, as well as their position. Another page describes the
structure of the School with the name of its Director, its vice-
directors, and administrative staff.
If the fraudster had visited these pages, then traces of such ac-
cesses should be detectable. Google analysis tools were installed on
the pages concerned and could provide indications. However, the
site of the School is usually accessed frequently. The feasibility of
distinguishing the traces left by the crooks from those left by the
usual accesses to the site was questionable. It is an elementary
reasoning in forensic science. If a systematic scan of the page ofFig. 5. Pattern of the activity. View of the number of individual pages “seen” (accessed) p
obvious relevance of the pattern, the detailed concept of “pages seen” belongs to the google
the authors of this article. An intuitive definition was, however, sufficient for the purpose.
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the traces detected by the Google tool.
The result was particularly convincing. A clear pattern emerged.
It indicated that something unusual happened at the site on August
6 and that vibrations had already occurred the day before (Fig. 5).
Finally, some indications on the origin of the fraud were also
sought: many accesses to the site were traced by the Google anal-
ysis tool, pointing to Lagos, in Nigeria. These traces find no
reasonable explanation other than the preparation and execution of
the fraud. Why would a systematic access to all pages of the
School's members from Lagos have occurred on that date and some
of them the day before? The School has no specific agreement or
collaborations with Nigeria. An access to the administrative page
was also noticed in these traces.
According to the survey, all respondents reported receiving the
first “Hello are you available?” email, and each at a different time. It
was a strong confirmation that the fraudster had sent the messages
one by one. From the more complete data processed by the IT
department, it became clear that the fraudster sent from zero to
four emails per minute (see also Fig. 6), by accessing the institu-
tional page of each member of the School. This pace seemed to
depend on the interactions he or she had with the people
responding to their messages. The fraudster was then probably
alone and doing the work by hand. In the exchanges of collected
emails, it was clear that a time difference of 1 hour appeared sys-
tematically. This is exactly the time difference between Switzerland
and Nigeria.
4.2.2. Specific thread
By studying specific threads of exchange, some interesting
patterns emerged. Here is the thread concerning Y:
Fraudster(11:58 am): “Hello are you available”.
Y (all the rest of conversation was in French, we translate e
12:00 pm): “Is it Prof. Ribaux? I don't recognize this email”.
Fraudster (in Frenche 12:03 pm): “It is my personal email. I'm in
a meeting right now and that's why I'm contacting you through
here. I should have called you but phone is not allowed to be
used during themeeting. I don't knowwhen themeeting will be
rounding off and I want you to help me out on something very
important right away”.
Y (in French e 12:06 pm): “Yes, of course. Today I was working
from home but if you need I can come to the university in the
afternoon without any problem. We can make an appointment
for later if you wish. What do you think about it?”
Fraudster (in French e 12:12 pm): “You don't have to come to
university. You have to help me get iTunes gift cards from theer day on the School's institutional site, a generated by “Google analytics”. Beyond the
tool and should be understood as a third definition which is not entirely transparent to
ilable?” Dealing with online frauds and the role of forensic science,
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Fig. 6. Progress of the fraud and measures taken. A timeline showing the incoming flow of the “Hello are you available?” message that has been systematically sent to each
member of the School. Fraud detection and actions taken are mentioned.
O. Ribaux, T.R. Souvignet / Forensic Science International: Digital Investigation xxx (xxxx) xxx 7store and send them to me here, I'll pay you back, I'll have to
send them to someone as soon as possible. »
Ye 12:16 pm): “Yes, of course, I can do it without any problem.
Can you give me more details about this (amount, name of the
recipient, etc.). - I have to put these details on the order.”
Fraudster (12:24 pm): “I need you to get an iTunes card for CHF
200 and send it to al****ta@gmail.com”as the recipient. Thank
you.”
Fraudster (12:36 pm): “She wants physical ID cards from the
store.”
Fraudster (12:42 pm): “When you have them, scratch them, take
pictures of the cards and attach them to this email, then send
them to me here or to his email, okay.”
Y (12:45 pm): “Isn't it the same as buying online? I'm sure you
receive a code with which you can access it. Otherwise I can go
to the store but it seems to me that it is the same process.”
Fraudster (12:50 pm): “Go to the store and get a physical iTunes
card. It can be 100 CHF in 2 pieces.”
Fraudster (12:54 pm) “When you receive them, scratch them,
take pictures of the cards and attach them to this email, then
send them to me here or to al****ta@gmail.com.”
Fraudster (01:19 pm): “Do you have the cards? I'm waiting for
the cards”
Eventually at 01:39 pm, Y sent message 1 (Fig. 1) attesting that
she had bought the cards, but online.
During the conversation, the fraudster showed some impa-
tience. For unknown reasons, he/she insisted on receiving photos
from the code of a real card, to be sent to another address
(al****ta@gmail.com), rather than the code from an online order.Please cite this article as: Ribaux, O., Souvignet, T.R., “Hello are you ava
Forensic Science International: Digital Investigation, https://doi.org/10.10This created confusion. The tone of the fraudster seems more and
more imperative and authoritarian.
Another interesting aspect emerged from the collection of
threads: when the first answer was in English, the rest of the
conversation continued in English. When the first answer was in
French, it continued in French. As a test, the first message was
translated with “Google translation” (Table 1). If this tool was
actually used by the perpetrator, this could have important con-
sequences on the extent of the fraud, as will be discussed below.
4.2.3. Other data available on the fraud
The university's IT department informed us that other de-
partments had also been affected before the school was. Subse-
quently, emails coming from other departments and further
exchanges of information with the IT department showed that
certain departments have been affected also after the School was.
Based on the survey, we were able to confirm that some
members of the School responded to the first “Hello are you
available?” message. Few of them continued the conversation, as
they detected the fraud early on. This was confirmed by the IT
department. Finally, on the basis of their data, they could determine
that each member (except the Director) received the “Hello are you
available?. The profile of the person who have answered the first
emails distributed in:
 A new employee;
 Researchers who do not speak French, and are using English at
the School;
 Professors having a strong daily interaction with the Director.
In addition, wewere able to compare the number of people from
the School who respondedwith the number of people from another
department who responded to the fraudster (the name of this
department is unknown to us) (Table 2):
This fraud is very global. On the Internet, it is very easy to findilable?” Dealing with online frauds and the role of forensic science,
16/j.fsidi.2020.300978
Table 1
The text translated from English to French through the online available tool ‘Google translation’31 is exactly the text sent by the fraudster when the first answer of the message
was in French. It contains some minor mistakes in French.
English Automatic translation in French
I'm in a meeting right now and that's why I'm contacting you through here. I should
have called you but phone is not allowed to be used during the meeting. I don't
know when the meeting will be rounding off and I want you to help me out on
something very important right away
Je suis en reunion en ce moment et c'est pourquoi je vous contacte ici. J'aurais dû
vous appeler, mais le telephone n'est pas autorise pendant la reunion. Je ne sais pas
quand la reunion s'achevera et je veux que vous m'aidiez immediatement sur
quelque chose de tres important
Table 2
Another department had also been targeted by the fraudster 20 days later, with the same modus operandi. The size of the department was much smaller, but the modus
operandi seems to have had a greater impact.
Shool of Criminal Justice Other department
Number of members having received the « Hello are you available?” message 118 19
Number of people who responded to the first message 7 (6%) 15 (79%)
More than two exchanges 2 (1,7%) 4 (21%)
Date and duration August 6, 2019,
1:53e15:38 (3h 45 min)
August 26, 2019
16:23e18:16 (1h 53 min)
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Universities, preeminently in North America, warning against such
fraudulent activities throughout 2019. These reports show how the
fraud has been persistent for at least one year. Bernstein (2019) also
discusses some of the author's limitations regarding the language
used, which is not meant to fit the style of an academic adminis-
trator. Beyond this, in a subsequent presentation (Perrig, 2019), it
was learned that one of the most advanced laboratories in cyber-
security in the country had also been the target of the fraud, at the
beginning of the year: 25% of the members of the department
immediately rushed to the boss's office in reaction to the message
“Hello are you available?”. Eventually, a description of the fraud
was found in the “Chronicle of higher Education”.4 This article
highlights how expectations, desires and pressure on researchers
can create a breeding ground for such frauds in universities.4.2.4. Synthesis of the modus operandi and victim profiles
This analysis leads to assume:
 It is a global fraud, but it is specifically targeted at university
departments;
 The perpetrator (alone), based in Lagos (NG), studied the
structure of the ESC through the institutional site;
 He or she systematically sent the message “Hello are you
available?”, in order of appearance on the site. It took approxi-
mately 1 hour and 45 minutes to reach all members of the
School;
 He or she was reactive, responding in the target language, using
Google translation if necessary;
 He or she wanted to get codes for iTunes gift cards;
 He had estimated the reasonable amount to ask for CHF 200
(about 200 US$);
 He or she used progressively more authoritarian language;
 He or she planned to use a different address to manage the
stolen codes. The monetization strategy remains unknown,
however;
 The fraud had an impact on new employees and foreign doctoral
students, who did not know the usual communication styles
used. Also, professors who have a high degree of operational
relationship with the Director.4 https://www.chronicle.com/article/Phishing-Scheme-Targets/245535, January
23, 2019, The chronicle of higher education.
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It can be considered a priori as a fraud that is not really based on
technology. However, it should be noted that everything relies on
complex technological infrastructures fully integrated into daily
life, and having radically changed themodes of communication and
opened new opportunities for fraudsters. In addition, the possible
use of an automatic translator, and therefore of artificial intelli-
gence, has changed everything on the scale and the global potential
of this fraud. Fraud was on the one hand very targeted (University
departments), but, on the other hand, probably globalized on a very
large scale through machine translation (see section 4.2.2.).5. Lessons learned, reporting and possible plans of action
This case has the potential to raise many general questions
about how high-volume online frauds are handled by professions,
and studied by academia.
Several positions have been adopted here by the Director and
the forensic expert having dealt with the case:
 as a manager, the Director felt responsible for what was going
on; the fact that an unknownperson tried to impersonate him to
extract money from his colleagues worked as a powerful driver
of this feeling;
 a manager is also concerned with the organization of the se-
curity of the establishment, in particular with the way in which
it is protected against standard fraud and by its resilience in the
event of a cyber-attack. The lessons learned from this situation
are therefore of the greatest interest from this point of view;
 their experience in computer science, crime analysis and digital
forensic science with police practice clearly guided their un-
derstanding of the situation and their reaction;
 they are, as researchers, particularly interested in the trans-
formations of crimes by digitalization, and about the role of
digital forensic science.
This fraud does not correspond to a high-level technological
crime. Rather it belongs to these volume cyber-crimes that insert
into daily life and routine activities (Felson and Boba, 2010). There is
no existing “profession” that would adequately prepare for both the
handling of this case in real-time, and for supporting its overall
interpretation. This was made very concrete by the ad hoc manner
in which the fraud was detected, the institutional vacuum that was
faced during the management of the crisis, and the post-analysis ofilable?” Dealing with online frauds and the role of forensic science,
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ature across disciplines.
This discussion is structured along four dimensions: (1) what
worked and what did not work both in the detection and handling
of the case, (2) general consideration about how this case can be
situated in current research about online frauds, and (3) what was
reported from the case and more global action taken, and (4) the
role of forensic science.
5.1. The detection and the response to the situation
The timeline (Fig. 6) shows the progress of the fraud, its
detection and the measures that have been taken. The fraud was
detected when about 40% of the School's members had already
received the message “Hello are you available?".
5.1.1. The detection and first measures
By a closer reading of the message from Y (message #1), the
detection time could have been shorter.
This is a common problem in serial crime analysis: the detection
of a previously unknown problem takes time, even when the
relevant data are already available and systematically monitored
(Grossrieder and Ribaux, 2019). In this particular case, the filtering
system set up by the IT department did not detect the fraud and the
anti-spam measures were ineffective. The early reaction of some
colleagues triggered the detection, demonstrating a certain level of
awareness within the organization. Once the problem was detec-
ted, retrospective analysis showed that it was already active before,
and the readiness to recognize a future occurrence became much
greater. This is also a very common mechanism in crime analysis.
The time elapsed since the message to all the employees was
sent (12 minutes after the fraud was detected), could have been
shorter. At that time, about half of the members of the School still
had not received the message “Hello are you available?”. Most
people reacted very positively to this warning. The difficulty of
immediately recognizing the specificities of fraud and its targeted
nature (Hypothesis A, known modus operandi against Hypothesis
B, unknown modus operandi) explains the reluctance to send the
alert message earlier. If the precise modus operandi of the fraud
had been known earlier, the elapsed time would have been
shorter.
The time that had elapsed since the University's IT department
was alerted was also too long. For their part, the reaction time was
very short. It only took, at lunch time, 7 minutes to implement a
script to block outgoing mail. However, their accessibility in terms
of tickets asking you to wait your turn is clearly not adequate in
case of emergency. It is clear, however, that university IT de-
partments are overwhelmed by the number of messages, of
varying degrees of urgency, they receive. They must organize a
request management system. Beyond, they are professionalizing
their overall approach to cybersecurity, including incident
response, and the monitoring of scams that reach and target
universities. They are also seeking to raise the level of awareness
in their organizations. However, there is a concern that their
approach only draws on common-sense knowledge of crimi-
nology, intelligence and forensic science.
5.2.2. Reporting and subsequent measures
The knowledge gained through this case has obviously been of
interest to the School, the University, and beyond that to all Swiss
universities. There was no reason why the fraud should not spread
further. As the modus operandi was known in detail, tailor-made3 Translated the 22nd of September 2019, through https://translate.google.be/.
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The case was reported through different channels with the aim
of making knowledge available to take repressive or preventive
measures to be taken at a strategical or operational level:
 almost immediately, a presentation of the case was made in a
meeting of all the responsible of IT security departments in
universities;
 several presentations were provided to the management of the
University, as well as to many colleagues under different
contexts;
 an email prepared by the IT department was sent to all the
departments onemonth later; as well as an article in the journal
of the IT department5 (four months later);
 a presentation in the form of a debriefing was organized spe-
cifically for the members of the School three months later;
 a presentation was organized for middle managers of the police
at a regional level;
 a presentation is planned for the International Association of
French-speaking Police Psychologists.6
Feedback received after such a dissemination indicate some
impact of these measures. The debriefing at the School was obvi-
ously very impactive, because it was based on something vivid. This
awareness raising initiative may even have exceeded a threshold of
information saturation. This sensitization to the problem should
significantly reduce the chances of successfully deploying similar
online frauds in a near future.
From the traces collected, which show a clear pattern of access
to the institutional site, it would certainly have been possible to
develop a more technological approach to automatically capture
the first signs of future attempts. This was not considered, mainly
for privacy reasons, and also on the basis of the amount of effort to
be made in balance with a subjective assessment of the impact of
the fraud and the effectiveness of the measure.
The psychological impact of the fraud was not to be under-
estimated either. This point is much clearer in a new literature in
criminology ( Button et al., 2014a; Cross, 2018). Debriefing with
those involved was considered a major objective. For the Director
having been impersonated by the fraudster, the impact was not
neutral at all.
Prosecution was ultimately a key point to address. Was it worth
reporting? Indeed, it was not so clear whether, from the point of
view of the criminal code, it was actually a crime. There was evi-
dence of preparation and some attempts to commit fraud. If the
activity was considered a crime, it is then not clear that the prep-
aration and attempts would have been considered a crime. In
imagining the likely origin of the fraud (Nigeria), it would have
been doubtful whether all the investigative efforts across jurisdic-
tions had been carried out for activities that are hardly considered a
crime, without anything of financial worth being stolen.
Finally, digital traces available to the School were used exten-
sively throughout the analysis or from a more investigative
perspective. The evaluative strength of these available digital
traces was low. However, if we consider the situation as a whole,
this is a type of serial fraud and the perpetrators could act on a
fairly large scale. There is a lack of knowledge to support the triage
of online fraud activities between petty individual crimes and
large-scale, organized serial crimes that are worthy of prosecu-
tion. Whatever these considerations, the case has been5 http://wp.unil.ch/cinn/2019/12/lunil-victime-de-spear-phishing-une-arnaque-
sur-mesure/(accessed the 30th of December, 2019).
6 Cercle des psychologues francophones de la police.
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tigating fraudulent activities, and presented to middle level
managers for training purposes.
6. Some more general considerations and the role of forensic
science
The handling of this specific case was satisfactory, given its
scope, impact and low severity. Some would even say exaggerated.
Whatever these opinions, it was clear that members of the School,
specially the persons who had to directly respond to the incident,
were frustrated by the absence of institutional and structured ap-
proaches for dealing with the case. The response here was entirely
constituted ad hoc. Whatever degree of structure is deemed
reasonable to deal with such crimes, there is a long way to the
current and usual structured treatment of typical high-volume
crimes or the comprehensive and effective implementation of
new incident-response methodologies in cybersecurity. In this
area, institutions, professions andmethods are not fully prepared to
deal with such pervasive crimes.
This case completely confirms opinions calling for more coor-
dination and collaboration between private and public institutions,
as well as the community in general. It is also a matter, especially
for the police, of taking distance from systematic prosecutions, as a
main objective (Dupont, 2017), in order to adopt instead more
comprehensive intelligence-led approaches, implement crime
analysis systems (Rossy and Ribaux, 2020), and develop knowledge
about what works and what does not work in terms of prevention
and repression.
Many relevant academic works are now emerging, but within
the typical silos of the disciplines. For example, cybersecurity is
mainly considered at a technological level (CMM, 2016); data sci-
entists are promoting big data analysis (Grossrieder and Ribaux,
2019); psychologists and criminologists scrutinize the methods
used by the fraudsters and their capacity for social engineering, the
profile of the perpetrators, the vulnerability of the victims and the
psychological impact of the fraud (Button et al., 2014a; Reep-van
den Bergh and Junger, 2018; Whitty, 2019); criminologists focus
on how to measure the phenomena (Reep-van den Bergh and
Junger, 2018) or how these new frauds can be explained by exist-
ing theories and what are their mechanisms (Leukfeldt et al., 2017;
Leukfeldt and Yar, 2016; Wall, 2010); forensic scientists remain
auxiliaries of the criminal justice system focused on the collection,
evaluation and presentation of evidence (Pollitt, 2010); not to speak
about the law community trying to define relevant judicial di-
mensions. All these works are highly relevant for interpreting parts
of our case, and some might be relevant for designing a response.
However, there is no cybersecurity methodology that integrates in
a balanced way all of these factors for dealing with such concrete
fraud campaign. There are many initiatives to advance interdisci-
plinary work in academia, but few successes in deriving practical
methodologies for dealing with problems when and as they occur.
In this context, what kind of viewpoint can be developed in the
field of forensic science? Casey (2019) first mentions that forensic
science and digital forensics should be much better integrated in
order to develop a structured and robust forensic ecosystem to deal
with the new situation. In particular, it is about developing
harmonized methodologies for forensic preparedness, exploiting
forensic intelligence, improving investigations, strengthening
evaluation of evidence, and lightweight agile retrospectives to
enable rapid improvements (Casey and Nikkel, 2020). Concepts
have to be worked out in order to avoid re-inventing knowledge
already developed for years in forensic science. Rather, they need to
be adapted to take better account of new digital environments with
a change of scale in the variety and volume of available traces, asPlease cite this article as: Ribaux, O., Souvignet, T.R., “Hello are you ava
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(Pollitt et al., 2018).
Such a vision also allows for the integration of physical and
digital traces to extract the information they convey about the
many forms of crimes that have been transformed by digitalization,
but still have a strong component in the real world (e.g. stolen
goods sold on auction sites or illicit drugs sold on the darknet).
Going further, the trace is considered by Boullier (2017) as the
most elementary data generated by human activities which should
constitute the main basis for studying sociological phenomena in a
digitalized society. The study of traces (traceology) generated by
unusual activities on different types of substrates (physical or
electronic) can be combined with crime analysis and, more broadly,
to certain theories in criminology, in order to constitute a focal
point where methodologies dedicated to the study of and response
to digitalized forms of crime should be discussed (Ribaux, 2019).
Is it not obvious that much of the handling of the “Hello are you
available?” fraud was based on traces generated by the activity of
the perpetrator, even though there was ultimately no prosecution.
Conclusion
In the many cases where this type of fraud has appeared in the
world, it probably did not trigger “crisis management”, a coordi-
nated response, and a lightweight agile retrospective. It is not
considered important enough and gives the impression that
everything is already known and that it is part of everyday life with
no significant loss. It does not seem challenging in technical or
forensic terms, because the modus operandi is heavily based on
social engineering. It is up to the users of the Internet infrastructure
to protect themselves. In any case, prosecution is still too difficult,
slow or even impossible in such situations. It seems that we cannot
do much more until legislation and cross-border evidence ex-
change has been harmonized and designed to make the investi-
gative process more effective (Biasiotti et al., 2018).
A similar situation has occurred in the recent history of policing.
Traditional high-volume property crimes that cross jurisdictions
(e.g. burglaries or all sorts of thefts and frauds) were increasing
dramatically during the eighties, and have required a strong reac-
tion. It took a long time to gradually define new strategies and new
policing style. The solutions found have been more proactive and
intelligence-led (i.e., not prosecution-focused), incorporating crime
analysis models based on crime concentrations, opportunities
theories in criminology and the use of physical traces. Knowledge
about what works and what does not work in terms of crime
disruption or harm reduction has also increased considerably
during this period (Ratcliffe, 2016; Ribaux et al., 2006). By analogy,
we are now in the same situation with online frauds than in the
past with traditional high-volume crimes. The difficulties in pros-
ecuting globalized crimes should be an incentive to find alternative
solutions in the same spirit. It is necessary to develop a new, well-
balanced, interdisciplinary proactive vision integrating digital
traces and their interpretation at the heart of the process (Rossy
and Ribaux, 2020).
We are far from this point. Larger institutions seem increasingly
better equipped, both technologically and in terms of cybersecurity,
to deal with such cases and protect themselves from cyberattack
that endanger or cause harms to their activities. However, what
became clear in our case study was effectively that there was no
comprehensive approach to policing online fraud, from data
collection to the production of intelligence that would point the
way to responses that are known to be efficient. Responsibilities are
scattered into many structures and areas of competencies. The
relevant expertise is focused on prosecution (the police) or cyber-
security (other stakeholders), and hard to mobilize for collectiveilable?” Dealing with online frauds and the role of forensic science,
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The common attitude of taking current organizational settings
and professions as rigid silos should be abandoned. When con-
fronted with real cases, the problem is the centre of interest, not a
predefined structure or area of knowledge. From the problem, so-
lutions, not restricted to prosecution or to technology, must be
found in real time either by finding the best skills and tools in agile
organizations. It was clear, in this case, that a generalist vision of
forensic science, incorporating criminological knowledge, as well as
a certain police practice were a solid basis for handling the case. In
this sense, such a case study can pave theway toward approaches to
policing online fraud fully integrating a reframed vision of forensic
science around the study of the trace (traceology).
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